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This paper asks whether the recent trade liberalization in
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico has led to increased transfer
of polluting activities to Latin America. Using a factor
content of trade approach, it shows that prior to liberalization,
all three countries specialized in relatively pollution-
intensive manufactures. Following liberalization, Argentina
and Brazil have increased their specialization in such
industries, while Mexico has moved in the opposite direction.
It is suggested that these differences are a result of the
structure of protection in the pre-liberalization period and
the increased stringency of environmental enforcement in
Mexico in the 1990s.
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I
Introduction
The fear that trade liberalization is incompatible with
sustainable development was a major concern
articulated by the protesters at the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) meeting in Seattle in 1999. One of
the main elements in the environmentalist concern is a
belief that developing countries will become “pollution
havens” attracting “dirty” industries because of their
less stringent environmental standards (Mabey and
McNally, 1999). Supporters of trade liberalization, on
the other hand, argue that it will have beneficial
environmental impacts both globally and within
developing countries (Esty, 1994, pp. 63-69).
There are a number of theoretical models of North-
South trade which predict that less stringent
environmental regulations will lead to an increase in
polluting production in the South when trade is
liberalized.1  Since weaker environmental regulation
leads to lower relative costs for the pollution-intensive
industry, the South will have a comparative advantage
in the “dirty” good. On the other hand, the North with
its stricter environmental regulations will tend to
specialize in relatively “clean” products.2
A crucial assumption of these models is that the
key difference between the North and South is the level
of environmental regulation. Those who believe that
trade liberalization can have a positive effect on the
environment have pointed out that environmental
control costs in manufacturing industry are generally
low and that factors other than environmental
considerations are more important determinants of
comparative advantage (Dean, 1992). In this case it is
quite possible that a developing country with a less
stringent environmental control system may
nevertheless have a comparative advantage in less
polluting industries. Where there is a correlation
between capital intensity and pollution intensity,
countries with a comparative advantage in labour-
intensive industries will benefit environmentally from
specializing according to their comparative advantage.
Indeed, pollution will tend to increase in the North,
because of its specialization in capital-intensive
industries, and be reduced in the South (Antweiler,
Copeland and Taylor, 1998). This is associated with
the view that the structure of protection in developing
countries has a “brown bias”. In other words, it is
suggested that, under import substitution regimes,
highly polluting industries tend to receive higher
protection than less polluting industries (Birdsall and
Wheeler, 1992).
The overall impact of trade liberalization on the
environment depends not only on the composition of
output, but also on its scale and on the technology used
(Grossman and Krueger, 1992). In so far as liberalization
leads to the growth of industrial production, then it will
tend to increase pollution. On the other hand, where trade
reform leads to the adoption of less polluting production
processes –for example, because of the increased
availability and lower cost of imported technology or
because production for export markets requires the use
of such technologies– then pollution per unit of output
will tend to fall. A full evaluation of the impact of trade
liberalization on a country’s environment would therefore
require a consideration of all three: scale, composition
and process effects.3
The focus of the present paper is more limited.
Whereas the impact of the scale effect on pollution is
clearly to increase it4  and the technology effect is
generally regarded as tending to reduce pollution, the
composition effect is ambiguous. The “pollution haven
hypothesis”5  suggests that where trade is liberalized,
there will be a tendency for the South, with its less
The author is grateful for the comments made by an anonymous
referee on an earlier version of this paper.
1 See, for example, Baumol and Oates (1988) and Copeland and
Taylor (1994).
2 The terms “dirty” and “clean” in this context refer to whether the
industries producing the good are highly polluting or not.
3 See Beghin and Potier (1997) for a survey of studies of the effects
of trade liberalization on manufacturing sector pollution which
covers all three effects.
4 There is of course the environmental Kuznets curve argument
that above certain levels of per capita income, pollution levels will
tend to decline. However, this is achieved by the composition and
technology effects outweighing the scale effect.
5 See Jensen (1996) for a discussion of different formulations of
the pollution haven hypothesis. He points out that a number of
authors emphasize the deliberate use of weak environmental
regulation to attract capital as constituting a pollution haven.
However, such a definition, which depends on the motivation of
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stringent environmental regulation, to become more
specialized in polluting industries. Put another way, it
implies that the composition effects associated with
trade liberalization will tend to increase pollution in
the South. Since the present paper does not address the
impact of trade liberalization on either the scale of
industrial production or on technology, it cannot show
whether or not trade liberalization increases or
decreases the level of industrial pollution locally. Its
aim is to examine whether trade liberalization has led
to greater or less specialization in pollution-intensive
industries and hence whether the composition effects
of trade liberalization are positive or negative for the
environment.
The trade liberalization that has taken place in Latin
America since the second half of the 1980s means that
it is a good area in which to examine the claims and
counterclaims that have been made regarding the impact
of greater openness on pollution. Since three countries,
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, account for over three
quarters of industrial production in the region, it was
decided to concentrate on these countries. The paper
examines whether trade liberalization has been
associated with increased specialization in more
polluting industries in the Latin American countries.
The major shift in economic policy regime that took
place in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico from the second
half of the 1980s is described in section II. Section III
provides a critical summary of a number of earlier
studies of the links between trade and pollution in Latin
America. Section IV discusses an alternative approach
to these linkages, based on a factor content model of
trade in which pollution is regarded as a factor of
production. The empirical part of the paper (section V)
looks at the pollution intensity of exports and imports
in the three countries and the way in which these have
changed following liberalization. Section VI offers
some conclusions.
II
Trade liberalization in Latin America
The period since the mid-1980s has seen a major
liberalization of the Latin American economies. Although
this has included a number of other elements such as
privatization, financial deregulation, tax reforms and
changes in the labour market, the most rapid and striking
changes have been in the opening of the region’s
economies through trade liberalization and changes in
policies towards foreign direct investment (FDI).
Of the three largest Latin American countries,
Mexico was the first to open up its economy in the mid-
1980s. Argentina and Brazil followed as part of a wave
of countries which began to liberalize around 1990.6
Trade liberalization involved the reduction of the
average level of import duties, a more uniform level of
tariffs (reduced dispersion), a reduction in the
proportion of trade covered by non-tariff barriers, and
reduced taxes on exports. The average tariff was reduced
between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s from over
50% to 14% in Argentina, from over 80% to 13% in
Brazil, and from over 40% to 14% in Mexico (Burki
and Perry, 1997, table 2.2; IDB, 1997, figure 17). By
the early 1990s, the proportion of items covered by non-
tariff barriers was less than 4% in Mexico, 1.5% in
Brazil and 0.2% in Argentina (Burki and Perry, 1997,
table 2.2).
At the same time that trade barriers were being
dismantled, these economies also relaxed their controls
on inward investment. Again, Mexico was the first of
the three countries to open up to foreign capital. From
1984 the regulatory framework became less restrictive
and in 1989 a new set of rules repealed all previous
regulations governing foreign investment and widened
the range of operations where 100% foreign ownership
was permitted. In 1993 a new law was passed which
consolidated these changes (Ros, Draisma and others,
1996) and a year later the implementation of the North
policy makers, cannot be tested empirically by analysing trade
patterns. He offers an alternative definition: “due to differences in
the acceptable levels of emissions to the decision makers, some
countries may gain a comparative advantage in the production of
pollution intensive goods” (Jensen, 1996, p. 320). This is the
interpretation given to the pollution haven hypothesis in this paper.
It is also the sense in which the term is used in the well known
paper by Birdsall and Wheeler (1992).
6 Different authors give different exact dates for the start of trade
liberalization in each country, but they are all agreed that the key
dates are around 1985 in Mexico and 1990 in Argentina and Brazil.
See Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (1993, table 1), Edwards (1995, table
1-1) and Burki and Perry (1997, chapter II.A).
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) further
opened up the Mexican economy to both trade and
investment from the United States and Canada. In
Argentina from 1989 onwards, restrictions on foreign
investment in a number of sectors including information
technology, telecommunications and electronics were
removed. In 1993 a new Foreign Investment Act was
passed which further opened up the economy to foreign
capital and removed all restrictions on profit remittances
(Chudnovsky and Lopez, 1997). By 1994, Argentina
had totally deregulated foreign investment (Edwards,
1995, table 7-10). In Brazil, change was less rapid than
in Mexico or Argentina. The new Constitution of 1988
in fact imposed more controls on the activities of foreign
firms. However, in the 1990s controls on outflows of
capital were removed and the entry of foreign firms
into the information technology industry was permitted.
The constitutional reforms of 1993 and subsequent
amendments approved after 1995 further liberalized
policy towards foreign investment (Chudnovsky and
López, 1997).
The results of the trade opening were clearly visible
in all three countries during the 1990s. The share of
trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)
increased first of all in Mexico after the mid-1980s and
then in Argentina and Brazil in the 1990s (table 1).
Similarly, foreign investment as a share of gross fixed
capital formation increased substantially in the post-
reform period.
TABLE 1
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Tradea
and foreign direct investment (FDI)b
as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)
(Percentages)
1980 1990 1995 2000
Argentina
Trade 15.4 14.5 21.4 25.7
FDI 6.9 6.4 10.8 25.6
Brazil
Trade 12.9 12.6 18.2 21.9
FDI 7.4 8.0 6.0 33.1
Mexico
Trade 27.6 32.9 46.6 77.7
FDI 3.6 8.5 14.4 16.9
Source: For the trade figures: ECLAC (2001), tables 58 and 61. For
the FDI figures: UNCTAD (2002), annex, table B6.
a By “trade” is meant total trade (imports + exports) as a share of GDP.
b By “FDI” is meant the total stock of foreign direct investment as a
percentage of GDP.
III
Previous studies of trade
and pollution in Latin America
Two kinds of previous studies can throw some light on
the links between trade policies and industrial pollution
in Latin America.7  One type of study focuses on the
pollution intensity of industrial production as a whole
and the way this varies between countries and over time.
The second type of study looks more explicitly at trade
and particularly at exports to see how polluting they
are, and how this has changed over time.
Within the first group, an influential study by two
World Bank economists in the early 1990s concluded
with the statement that: “‘pollution havens’ can be
found, but not where they have generally been sought.
They are in protectionist economies.” (Birdsall and
Wheeler, 1992, p.167).
They based this on a finding that more open
economies in the region tended to have a lower rate of
pollution growth than more protected economies.
A critique of this study, however, has pointed to a
number of weaknesses (Rock, 1996). First, it only
considers toxic emissions, which are not necessarily
correlated with conventional air or water pollutants.
7 The studies considered here are all ex post studies based on actual
trade patterns. There have also been several attempts to estimate
the likely impact of trade liberalization on pollution using
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, both for individual
countries and for the world as a whole. These are not discussed
here since they tend to operate with very broad sectors and are in
any case ex ante studies of the predicted effects of liberalization,
so that the results depend on the particular specification of the
model. For a review of some of these studies, see Beghin and Potier
(1997).
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Second, it bases its measure of trade openness on the
Dollar Index, which has itself been subject to criticism
(Rodrik, 1994). Third, Birdsall and Wheeler compare
the rate of growth of pollution intensity rather than the
absolute level in open and closed economies. Lastly, it
has been suggested that the lower growth of pollution
in more open economies may be a statistical artefact.8
Rock’s own estimates (not just for Latin America) show
that more open economies tend to have a more polluting
composition of output.
A more recent World Bank study (Mani and
Wheeler, 1999) has shown a steady increase in the share
of polluting industries in Latin American production
since the early 1960s, which is in marked contrast to
the decrease in the share of such industries in Europe,
North America and Japan. This implies that the
dominant trend in Latin America has been for
production to become more pollution-intensive. This
is supported by a study of Mexico, which found a
significant increase in the toxic intensity of production
up to the late 1980s (Ten Kate, 1993).
From the point of view of analysing the impact of
trade liberalization on pollution, a major limitation of
these studies is that they generally cover a period up to
the mid or late 1980s, or at the very latest the beginning
of the 1990s. Since, as was seen above, liberalization
only began in the mid-1980s in Mexico and at the
beginning of the 1990s in Argentina and Brazil, it is
necessary to look at more recent data in order to evaluate
what occurred in terms of pollution intensity during
the 1990s. A second limitation is that all the studies
have concentrated on toxic emissions and, as was
pointed out above, these are not necessarily
representative of all forms of pollution. Lastly, since
they look at industrial production as a whole, the trends
observed are not necessarily just a reflection of the
impact of trade on pollution, but may be picking up a
number of other influences.
From the point of view of analysing the impact of
trade liberalization, the second set of studies, those
which have looked directly at the links between trade
and pollution in Latin America, are more relevant. A
World Resources Institute study estimated the total
pollution attributable to export production in various
Latin American countries, mainly in the early 1990s.
The study also looked at the change in the proportion
of output exported in different industries, concluding
tentatively that there was a slight tendency for export
expansion to be concentrated in low pollution-intensity
sectors relative to high-pollution sectors (Runge and
others, 1997). The data used for both Argentina and
Brazil were extremely limited, but in the case of Mexico
the share of exports in the production of high pollution-
intensity industries fell significantly in the early 1990s.
A more detailed recent ECLAC study of nine Latin
American countries found that, in absolute terms, there
had been a tendency for the volume of exports from
“dirty” industries to increase since the early 1980s in
all the countries studied. However, the share of these
industries in exports declined significantly in the late
1980s or the early 1990s for all countries apart from
Brazil (Schaper, 1999). The recent trend has therefore
been towards less pollution-intensive industries.
Another ECLAC study of eight of the nine countries
covered by Schaper found a more mixed pattern, with
three countries (Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica)
seeing an increase in the share of manufactured exports
coming from polluting industries (Schatan, 1999). In
the five remaining countries, however, the growth in
pollution associated with exports was a result of an
increase in the volume of exports, rather than a change
in composition towards more polluting industries.9
There have also been a limited number of studies
of individual countries that have looked at the
relationship between export structure and pollution. In
Argentina, the share of pollution-intensive industries
in exports of manufactures both to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries and to all destinations declined between 1990
and 1997 (Chudnovsky, Porta and others, 1996, table
V.1; Chudnovsky, Cap and others, 1999, tables 9 and
10).
In Brazil, which is characterized by a relatively
high participation of “dirty” industries in its exports,
these industries increased their share of exports
significantly during the 1980s (Jha, Markandya and
Vossenaar, 1999, table 4.3) and continued to be
particularly dynamic during the first half of the 1990s
8 Specifically, it is pointed out that the variable used to measure
trade orientation is an interaction term between the rate of per capita
income growth and the so-called Dollar Index of trade orientation.
Rock (1996) suggests that what this variable is picking up is the
impact of the growth rate rather than trade orientation.
9 These two studies differ in the export classification used, with
one using the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)
and the other the International Standard Industrial Classification
of All Economic Activities (ISIC), in the universe considered (total
versus manufactured exports), and in the time period covered.
me of the studies of Brazil (Young, 1999; Young and others 2001)
and one study of Mexico (Aroche, 2000).
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(Ferraz and Young, 1999). Further evidence of Brazil’s
specialization in relatively polluting industries is the
fact that the average pollution intensity of exports is
greater than that of the manufacturing sector as a whole
for most indicators of pollution in both the 1980s and
the 1990s (Young, 1998; MMA, 2001). It has also been
noted that exports are considerably more pollution-
intensive than imports (Young, Lustosa and others,
2001, table 4.3).
In the case of Mexico, the concerns about the
environmental impacts of NAFTA led to a number of
studies during the early 1990s which looked at the
structure of Mexican trade (Grossman and Krueger,
1992; Low, 1992). These found that Mexican exports
were not heavily concentrated in pollution-intensive
industries and that United States imports from Mexico
were not related to pollution abatement costs in the
former. A study of the period prior to the signing of
NAFTA found that, on balance, trade liberalization in
Mexico during the 1980s and early 1990s had a positive
environmental impact (Aroche, 2000), while a study
of the period since NAFTA came into force found that
the structure of Mexican exports had become less
pollution-intensive (Schatan, 2000).
The picture that emerges from these studies of
trade-environment linkages in Latin America does not
therefore present much support for the hypothesis that
“pollution havens” have been created through the
transfer of polluting production to the region. Indeed,
both in Argentina and Mexico and in other countries in
the region, the evidence suggests that in recent years
the trend has been away from specialization in “dirty”
industries.
There are, however, several limitations of these
previous studies which make it necessary to consider
the issue further. First, almost all the trade studies
concentrate solely on exports.10  A fuller analysis of
the implications of trade liberalization for specialization
in pollution-intensive industries requires an analysis of
a country’s import patterns as well as exports. This
paper will therefore consider the pollution intensity of
imports11  as well as exports.
Second, many of the studies focus on the share
of pollution-intensive industries in manufacturing
exports from the region.12  This presents a number
of problems. The definition of “dirty industries”
differs from study to study. Different indicators are
used to classify industries by pollution intensity.
Some industr ies  use the share of  pol lut ion
abatement costs as an indicator while others use
emissions data. Moreover, the cut-off point above
which industries are regarded as highly polluting
is essentially arbitrary. An arbitrary allocation of
industries can be avoided by using emissions
coefficients for all industries and applying them to
the levels of exports and imports to measure the
average pollution intensity of trade, as is done in
the present paper.
A third limitation of some of the studies is the
level of aggregation at which they have been carried
out. The study by Runge and others (1997) is at the
two-digit level of the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC), which consists of
such broad aggregates as “non-metal products” and
“metal products”. The studies of Argentina by
Chudnovsky, Cap and others (1999), Brazil by
Ferraz and Young (1999) and both the Latin
American and Mexican studies by Schatan (1999
and 2000) are at the three-digit level of the ISIC,
which subdivides manufacturing industry into 28
sectors. Even the three-digit classification puts
together industries such as tanning and leather
finishing (3231) and leather products (3233),
although the former has toxic emissions per million
dollars of output more than 200 times greater than
the latter (Hettige, Martin and others, 1995, table
5.5).13  The current study reduces this problem by
est imating pollut ion from trade data for  82
industries classified at the four-digit level of the
ISIC.
10 An exception are some of the studies of Brazil (Young, 1999;
Young, Lustosa and others 2001) and one study of Mexico (Aroche,
2000).
11 As Aroche (2000) indicates (p. 24), “it is important to consider
imports, since they implicitly substitute production that would have
generated pollution in the country and which is shifted to the place
where the imported goods are produced”.
12 Schaper (1999), Chudnovsky, Cap and others (1999), Jha,
Markandya and Vossenaar (1999) and Low (1992) all use this
variable. Runge and others (1997) look at changes in the share of
exports accounted for by “dirty” industries in Latin America, while
Grossman and Krueger (1992) use imports from Mexico as a share
of United States shipments by industry as the dependent variable.
13 This is less of a problem in the case of the studies which used the
SITC at the three-digit level.
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IV
An alternative approach to trade and pollution
1. Pollution as a factor of production
In view of these limitations, this paper adopts a different
approach to analysing the impact of trade liberalization
on industrial pollution. The starting point of this
approach is to think of emissions as an input into the
production process. Although emissions are often
regarded as an output of production, they reflect the
fact that environmental resources have been used up in
production (Rauscher, 1997, p. 30). Thus, it is possible
to think of traded goods as embodying a certain quantity
of environmental resources.14  The implication of this
approach is that trade flows involve international
transfers of environmental resources. If a country’s
exports generate more pollution than its imports, then
that country is a net exporter of environmental
resources. Conversely, if it specializes in relatively
“clean” products, then it will be an importer of
environmental resources.
This conceptualization of pollution makes it
parallel to the way in which other inputs such as skill,
labour and capital are regarded in the “factor content
of trade” literature. This approach has been used to test
the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and to estimate the impact
of trade on the demand for factors of production. It has
its origins in Leontief’s famous study of United States
trade which gave rise to the “Leontief paradox”.
2. The general factor content model
The general factor content model estimates factor




xi is a (q x 1) vector of factor quantities per
million dollars of exports, A is a (q x r) matrix of
coefficients of each factor used per million dollars of
output in each of the country’s r manufacturing sectors,
and x is an (r x 1) vector of sectoral shares of the
country’s manufacturing exports. Similarly, the factor
content of imports can be calculated as an import-
weighted average of sectoral factor input coefficients
z
mi. A country’s exports are then found to be relatively
intensive in a factor for which z
xi > zmi.
Once it is recognized that pollution can be regarded
as an environmental resource input into production, then
it is logical to use emissions coefficients per dollar of
output to calculate the environmental resource content
of trade. The effect of trade on a country’s utilization
of environmental resources can also be calculated in
the same way as the demand for labour. The total impact
on pollution is then:
[2] Zi = Xi(zxi - zmi)
where Zi is a vector of different emissions and Xi is the
total (scalar) value of country i’s exports of
manufactures.
There are a number of issues that need to be
addressed when this model is operationalized in order
either to test factor content theories of international
trade, or to estimate the impact of trade on factor
demand. These include the type of coefficient to use,
whether to use home country or international
coefficients and how to deal with trade imbalances.
The first question is whether to use factor inputs
per dollar of value added or per dollar of output. The
emissions of a particular industry or firm are likely to
be more closely related to the value added within that
industry than to gross output. On the other hand, trade
data are measured in terms of gross output, not value
added (except often in the case of export processing
zones). There is a dilemma here, since, as Wood (1994,
p. 72) points out, “if gross output is used, the effects on
factor demand are blurred; but if value added is used,
the linkage with trade flows is obscured.”
In practice, the tendency is to use coefficients based
on gross output.
The other aspect involved in choosing coefficients
is whether to use those of the home country or the
trading partner. This is clearly a real issue, since
differences in stringency of regulation will lead to
considerable differences in emissions per unit of output
between developed and less developed countries. The
appropriate choice of coefficient depends on the precise
14 Lee and Roland-Holst (1993), who used the concept of embodied
effluent trade, adopted a similar approach.
15 This presentation follows Wood (1994, pp. 67 and 68).
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question that is being addressed. If the aim were to
measure the effect of trade on the actual pollution load
in a country, then it would be appropriate to apply
domestic coefficients to both exports and imports on
the assumption that imports could be produced locally
with the same level of pollution per unit of output as in
import-competing industries.
However, the objective here is somewhat different:
it is to evaluate whether or not trade liberalization has
led to a greater specialization in the Latin American
countries in industries which are pollution-intensive in
the North. Thus, it is appropriate to use coefficients
from developed countries as an indicator of pollution
intensity. This is fortunate because the major source of
detailed data on emissions per dollar is the United
States, and these are the coefficients that are used.16
Lastly, a country’s trade in manufactures is unlikely
to be in balance. There is therefore a question of whether
to take this into account in estimating the effects on
factor demand or not. Latin American countries have
experienced large swings in their trade balances in
recent years, so that this would tend to distort the
changes in environmental resource transfers on a year-
to-year basis. The conventional approach is to look at
balanced trade, and this is implicit in equation [2] above,
where import- and export-weighted emission
coefficients are applied to the value of exports (Wood,
1994, p. 69).
3. Formulation of the hypotheses
The issue of “pollution havens” in Latin America can
be looked at from a number of points of view. A first
question is whether exports are more pollution-intensive
overall than imports. If so, this implies a net transfer of
environmental resources from Latin America to the rest
of the world. This would mean that Latin America has
a revealed comparative advantage in pollution-intensive
industries, although it has to be borne in mind that since
actual trading patterns reflect existing trade restrictions,
this does not necessarily mean that the region would
have a comparative advantage in such industries under
free trade.
A second question is whether trade liberalization
leads to greater specialization in pollution-intensive
industries. This can be examined by looking at the
way in which the relative pollution intensity of exports
and imports has changed since liberalization. If there
has been an increase in this ratio, then it can be
assumed that the “pollution haven” hypothesis, in the
broad sense of shifts in the location of polluting
production, is valid. As indicated above, previous
studies of trade and pollution in Latin America have
only looked at the composition of exports. This can
give rise to misleading results because there is
evidence that world trade in relatively polluting
industries has in recent years grown less quickly than
for less polluting ones (Xu, 1999, table 1). It is
important therefore, in evaluating any hypothesis
about specialization, to look at imports as well as
exports. This is of course the approach followed in
conventional factor content studies of international
trade. The few studies which have employed a factor
content approach to environmental issues have also
looked at both exports and imports (Kalt, 1988;
Robison, 1988; Lee and Roland-Holst, 1993).
A third question is whether trade liberalization
leads to increased or reduced pollution in the Latin
American countries. This might at first sight seem to
be just a slightly different way of addressing the point
made in the previous paragraph, but that is not the case.
An analogy with the employment effects of trade
liberalization may help illustrate the point. If exports
are more labour-intensive than import-competing
production, a matched increase in exports and imports
will lead to an increase in employment even if the
average labour intensity of exports does not increase.
Similarly, even if a country does not increase its
specialization in polluting industries, total pollution can
still increase.
Thus we can formulate three distinct hypotheses:
— Hypothesis 1: Latin American countries will tend
to specialize in relatively polluting industries so
that z
xi > zmi at a point in time.
— Hypothesis 2: Following liberalization, Latin
American countries will tend to increase their
specialization in polluting industries so that z
xi/zmi will
be greater after liberalization than it was before it.
— Hypothesis 3: Following liberalization, the
combined effect of the increased volume of trade
(scale effects) and the changing composition of
trade is to increase the level of domestic pollution
in Latin America.
16 This is another reason why this analysis cannot be taken to
measure the impact of trade liberalization on pollution in the
liberalizing country. Since environmental regulation is more
stringent in the United States than in Latin America, the use of
United States coefficients underestimates the actual pollution load
associated with exports in Latin America. However, assuming that
the relative pollution intensities of industries do not differ greatly
between countries, the calculations do indicate the direction of
change in actual pollution.
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V
Trade liberalization and pollution havens
in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
1. Data
In order to test these hypotheses, data is required on
emissions coefficients and on exports and imports. Most
previous studies which have used pollution coefficients
have tended to use one indicator, usually related to toxic
emissions. However, it has been noted that there is no
necessary correlation amongst all indicators of pollution
intensity, so that the use of a single indicator can be
misleading (Hettige, Martin and others, 1995).
Therefore, it was decided to use as wide a range of
pollutants as was practicable for the analysis. The
coefficients used were those of the Industrial Pollution
Projection System (IPPS),17  which have been calculated
by the World Bank on the basis of United States data
measuring emissions of a wide range of pollutants per
dollar of output, value added or person employed.18
These included toxic pollution, toxic metal
pollution, six conventional air pollutants (sulphur
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, volatile
organic compounds, fine particulates and total
particulates) and two water pollutants (biochemical
oxygen demand and total suspended solids). Output-
based coefficients were selected for this exercise since,
as was indicated above, exports and imports are
measured in terms of gross output rather than their value
added.
These coefficients were then applied to figures for
imports and exports of manufactures, reclassified by
the four-digit level of the ISIC, which were made
available by ECLAC. The reason for limiting the trade
data to manufactured goods was because the “pollution
haven” hypothesis applies mainly to activities which
are not tied to a particular geographical location. Other
sectors such as mining or agriculture are less likely to
be affected by differences in environmental regulation
since they are geographically less mobile.19
2. Results
The first question to consider is whether or not the three
Latin American countries specialize in relatively
polluting industries or not, and thus whether they are
net exporters of environmental resources. As indicated
above, this can be done by comparing the average
pollution intensity of a dollar of exports with that of a
dollar of imports. Table 2 shows the ratio of pollution
per dollar of exports to imports for each pollutant at
the beginning of each country’s liberalization process
and in 1996, the latest year for which trade data were
available.
The 1996 data show a very sharp contrast between
Argentina and Brazil on the one hand and Mexico on
the other. In the two South American countries, exports
are more polluting than imports for eight of the 10
pollutants covered, the exceptions being toxics and
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) in the case of
Argentina and toxics and volatile organic compounds
(VOC) for Brazil. In the case of Mexico, however,
imports were more pollution-intensive for all indicators
apart from fine particulates (PM10). Thus the first
hypothesis, that the Latin American countries are net
exporters of environmental resources is largely
supported in Argentina and Brazil, but not in the case
of Mexico.
Table 2 also provides data on the ratio of pollution
intensity of exports to imports prior to liberalization.
In the case of Argentina and Brazil, these refer to 1990,
while for Mexico, which began to liberalize earlier, 1985
is taken as the point of comparison. The contrast
between the South American countries and Mexico is
just as sharp when it comes to the changes which have
taken place in the relative pollution intensity of exports
17 The use of coefficients derived from United States pollution data
is consistent with the purpose of assessing whether or not Latin
American countries have increased their specialization in industries
which are pollution-intensive in developed countries.
18 See Hettige, Martin and others (1995) for details of the IPPS. The
coefficients are available at the World Bank’s New Issues in
Pollution Regulation (NIPR) web page (http://www.worldbank.org/
html/prdei/ipps/ippshome.html).
19 Warhurst and Hughes-Witcomb (2001) discuss the pollution haven
hypothesis in the context of Latin American mining and conclude
that it does not hold.
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and imports since they began to open up their
economies. In Argentina and Brazil, eight of the 10
indicators increased over the period, while in the case
of Mexico all but one fell. Thus, the second hypothesis
seems to be largely corroborated for Argentina and
Brazil, but clearly rejected in Mexico. It is also worth
noting that prior to liberalization, the situation in
Mexico was not unlike that in Argentina and Brazil,
since in the mid-1980s exports tended to be more
polluting than imports for the majority of pollutants.
The third hypothesis addresses the impact of
liberalization on emissions within the Latin American
countries. This can be thought of as the combined effect
on pollution of the scale of trade and changes in the
composition of trade. If exports are more polluting than
imports initially, then an increase in the level of trade
must lead to a net increase in emissions so that the scale
effect will be positive.20  Since at the start of
liberalization this condition held for most indicators in
all three countries, and since shifts in composition have
tended to increase relative pollution intensity in
Argentina and Brazil, it should follow that total
emissions increased in both. In the case of Mexico,
where exports became relatively less pollution-intensive
over time, the combined impact of scale and
composition effects is ambiguous.
Table 3 shows the net change in emissions for each
pollutant between the start of liberalization (1985 for
Mexico and 1990 for Argentina and Brazil) and 1996.
This was calculated by applying the IPPS four-digit
emission coefficients to the structure of exports and
imports in the base year and in 1996, and then
calculating the change between the two years. As
indicated above, in order that the results were not
affected by changes in the balance of trade in
manufactures in each year, the calculation was based
on the assumption that total manufactured imports were
equal to manufactured exports. In other words the
change in emissions was calculated as:
[3] Z’i - Zi = X’i(z’xi – z’mi) - Xi(zxi - zmi)
where ’ denotes the terminal year figure and symbols
without ’ refer to the base year.
The contrast between Argentina and Brazil on the
one hand, and Mexico on the other, could not be starker.
In the two South American countries, nine of the 10
pollutants showed an increase in domestic emissions21
following liberalization, whereas in Mexico the same
number showed a reduction, the exception being fine
particulates. Thus in Argentina and Brazil, as expected,
the combined effect of increased levels of trade and
changes in composition led to an increase in pollution,
while in Mexico the effects of changes in composition
towards less polluting industries more than outweighed
the increased level of trade. Thus Mexico shows the
TABLE 2
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Relative pollution intensity of exports to imports
at the start of liberalization
Argentina Brazil Mexico
1990 1996 1990 1996 1985 1996
Toxics 0.54 0.86 0.70 0.88 0.88 0.67
Metals 1.21 1.27 2.17 2.68 1.31 0.99
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) 1.47 1.61 1.77 1.87 1.78 0.83
Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) 1.02 1.19 1.29 1.31 1.42 0.67
Carbon monoxide (CO) 1.03 1.03 2.03 2.14 1.16 0.74
Volatile organic compounds (VOC) 0.90 1.13 0.97 0.94 1.43 0.78
Fine particulates (PM10) 4.69 6.79 4.50 4.08 3.48 1.62
Total suspended particles (TSP) 3.19 4.29 2.56 2.88 1.80 0.96
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) 0.70 0.80 1.08 1.37 0.65 0.42
Total suspended solids (TSS) 1.66 1.55 4.39 4.89 0.74 0.88
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of ECLAC trade data and International Pollution Projection System (IPPS) coefficients.
20 Note that this is different from the situation where output is being
considered. In that case the scale effect is positive by definition
since, other things being equal, an increase in production cannot
lead to less pollution. Where trade is concerned, and therefore both
exports and imports are increasing, then whether the scale effect
increases or decreases pollution depends on whether or not exports
generate more emissions than import substitutes.
21 This implies either a larger surplus in terms of environmental
resources exported, or a smaller deficit.
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type of change predicted by those who believe that there
are win-win opportunities to be gained with trade
liberalization.
3. Interpretation
The consistent contrast between Mexico and the South
American countries which this analysis reveals raises
the question of why such differences occur. As indicated
above, one of the reasons why some authors have
predicted that trade liberalization would lead to less
polluting production in developing countries is because
they believe that under import substitution, protectionist
policies tended to favour “dirty industries” and that this
“brown bias” would be removed. How far was this true
of the three Latin American countries in the period
before the recent trade opening?
In order to answer this question, the structure of
protection in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico prior to the
period of liberalization was analysed. Appropriate sectoral
estimates of the effective rate of protection (ERP) were
obtained for 1973 for Brazil (Coes, 1991, table 4.1), 1980
for Argentina (Cavallo and Cottani, 1991, table 3.19) and
1979 for Mexico (Ten Kate and Mateo Venturini, 1989,
table 4). On the basis of these data, industries were
classified into those with high and low levels of effective
protection.22  In Brazil and Mexico, industries were
considered to have high levels of protection if the ERP
was over 50%, while in Argentina, where the overall level
of protection was higher, an industry was classified as
having high ERP when it was over 75%.
Having classified the two groups of industries, it
was then possible to calculate the average pollution
intensity for high and low ERP industries, and derive a
ratio between the pollution intensity of the two groups.
If protection has a “brown bias”, i.e., tends to protect
the more highly polluting industries, then the ratio is
greater than one. Surprisingly, in the case of Argentina
and Brazil the bias was in the opposite direction, with
the most heavily protected industries having relatively
low emissions of most pollutants (table 4). Only Mexico
conformed to expectations, with highly protected
industries being relatively pollution-intensive, with the
exception of total suspended solids and particulates.
This pattern of protection may help explain the
mixed results found in the three countries after
liberalization. In Mexico, where “dirty” industries were
highly protected prior to liberalization, changes in trade
policy led to reduced emissions as these industries
tended to contract relative to less polluting industries.23
On the other hand, in Argentina and Brazil, where there
was no such “brown bias” in the structure of protection,
exports remained more polluting than imports as the
“pollution haven” hypothesis implies.
TABLE 3
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Changes in net emissions associated




Toxics 23,112 23,571 -60,102
Metals 179 5,598 -1,504
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) 7,804 33,428 -65,843
Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) 5,309 7,880 -50,347
Carbon monoxide (CO) 43 29,974 -56,377
Volatile organic compounds (VOC) 5,345 -2,268 -27,862
Fine particulates (PM10) 8,222 6,420 3,143
Total suspended particles (TSP) 12,623 17,749 -7,521
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) 745 8,226 -19,389
Total suspended solids (TSS) -9,670 92,011 -38,600
Source: Author’s calculations based on International Pollution Projection System (IPPS) coefficients and ECLAC trade data.
22 Some industries were omitted due to the absence of estimates of
effective protection. Also, in some cases estimates were only
available at the two-digit level and it was assumed that the three-
digit industry shared the same characteristics in terms of protection
as the two-digit industry to which it belonged.
23 It is noticeable that the only pollutant for which changes in trade
flows between 1985 and 1996 led to an increase in emissions was
fine particulates (see table 3). This stands out in table 4 as a case
where, contrary to other pollutants, emission levels per unit of
output were much higher in less protected industries.
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A second factor which may partly account for the
differential impact of liberalization on pollution
intensity between the countries is that environmental
regulation in Mexico was tightened significantly in
the early 1990s, at the time of the NAFTA negotiations,
particularly in terms of monitoring and enforcement
(Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1996, pp. 119-125). This
was a response to fears in the United States that under
free trade Mexico would become a “pollution haven”,
which threatened to derail the agreement
(Hogenboom, 1998, chapter 6). Stricter environmental
regulation would tend to reduce the comparative
advantage which Mexico had in pollution-intensive
industries in the 1980s.
VI
Conclusion
This paper set out to investigate whether or not the fears
of environmentalists concerning the likely impact of
trade liberalization on industrial pollution had been
confirmed by the experience of the main Latin
American countries since they began to liberalize their
trade. In particular, the paper focused on the “pollution
haven” hypothesis, interpreted in terms of the tendency
for countries with less stringent environmental
regulations to become more specialized in pollution-
intensive industries.
The cases of Argentina and Brazil indicate that
liberalization has been associated with a shift towards
greater specialization in polluting industries and a
tendency for the level of domestic pollution to increase.
The Mexican case, however, shows the opposite: a trend
towards specialization in less polluting sectors and
reduced domestic pollution. It was suggested that this
could be a reflection of the differences in the pattern of
protection before liberalization, which meant that
“dirty” industries had been more highly protected in
Mexico than in the South American countries. It was
also pointed out that in Mexico, trade liberalization was
accompanied by a tightening of environmental
regulation in order partly to allay United States fears
concerning “pollution havens” and “industrial flight”.
In concluding, a number of caveats are in order.
Although the analysis has been based on much more
disaggregated data than any previous study of trade and
environment in Latin America (four-digit ISIC), this may
still be too high a level to capture some of the processes
that are taking place within industries. Thus, for
example, in the Brazilian tanning industry it has been
found that there has been increased specialization in
the production of wet blue for the export market
(Odegard, 2000). The production of wet blue is the most
polluting part of the tanning business, as well as having
TABLE 4
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Pollution-intensity ratio
between high and low ERP industries
Argentina Brazil Mexico
1980 1973 1979
Total toxics 0.32 0.17 1.42
Total metals 1.11 0.05 1.60
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) 0.81 1.32 1.34
Total suspended solids (TSS) 0.30 0.01 0.41
Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) 0.13 0.39 2.30
Fine particulates (PM10) 0.08 0.16 0.18
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) 0.24 0.19 3.64
Carbon monoxide (CO) 0.23 0.11 2.01
Total particles (TP) 0.21 0.44 0.98
Volatile organic compounds (VOC) 0.15 0.63 3.27
Source: Author’s calculations based on International Pollution Projection System (IPPS) coefficients and United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) data.
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a relatively low value added. Tanners in developed
countries are choosing to outsource supplies of wet blue
and concentrate on higher value added and less
polluting processes in their domestic markets. Thus,
there is a clear case of “pollution transfer” to Brazil in
this industry. However, this is not apparent when
working with aggregate data, even at the four-digit level,
where ISIC 3231 (tanneries and leather finishing)
includes all leather-making processes.
A second caveat relates to what the paper does not
attempt to do. It does not provide a full evaluation of
whether trade liberalization has led to increased
pollution in Latin America. Such an analysis would
require consideration, not only of the scale and
composition effects of increased trade on pollution, but
also of the process effects (Grossman and Krueger,
1992). The data used in this paper, which is based on
fixed emissions coefficients, preclude an analysis of
the process effects of liberalization. In so far as the paper
does discuss the impact on domestic pollution in Latin
America, it should be emphasized that it abstracts from
these effects. However, since the main concern is to
consider the distribution of relatively polluting
activities, this does not invalidate the discussion of the
pollution haven hypothesis.
A complete evaluation of the impact on domestic
pollution would have to consider a number of further
possible links between trade and pollution. On the
positive side, it has been suggested that production for
export markets exposes firms to pressures to reduce
their pollution and improve their environmental
management systems. It has also been said that trade
liberalization leads to better access to imported
technology and cleaner processes. Against this, it may
be the case that the increased competition associated
with liberalization makes firms less able or willing to
internalize environmental costs and thus proves a drag
on efforts to reduce pollution. Similar issues arise
around the role of increased foreign investment.
Unfortunately, there is not space to address these issues
in this paper.24
A further reason why the paper cannot be taken as
a full evaluation of the environmental effects of
liberalization is that it has not considered the
implications of liberalization for environmental policy.
For some critics, trade liberalization tends to give rise
to a “race to the bottom” in terms of environmental
standards, since firms obtain a competitive advantage
from less stringent regulation. A more moderate view
sees environmental regulation becoming “bogged
down” as a result of increased trade openness. A full
discussion of the effects of trade liberalization on
pollution in Latin America would, at the very least, need
to consider whether or not such effects operated and
thus potentially contributed indirectly to increased
pollution.
What the paper has done is to use a factor content
of trade methodology to look at the relative pollution
intensity of exports and imports in semi-industrialized
Latin American countries. This showed that at the
beginning of the 1990s, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
all specialized in relatively “dirty” industries. However,
since then Mexico has moved in the opposite direction
to the Southern Cone countries. The latter have
increasingly shifted to more polluting industries,
whereas Mexico has increased its comparative
advantage in low-pollution industries. In the case of
Mexico, the lack of conformity with the predictions of
the pollution haven hypothesis reflects a strong bias in
protection in favour of dirty industries before
liberalization and stricter enforcement of environmental
regulation in the 1990s.
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